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Abstract—We study opinion dynamics in a social network
with stubborn agents who influence their neighbors but who
themselves always stick to their initial opinion. We consider
first the well-known DeGroot model. While it is known in the
literature that this model can lead to consensus even in the
presence of a stubborn agent, we show that the same result holds
under weaker assumptions than has been previously reported.
We then consider a recent extension of the DeGroot model in
which the opinion of each agent is a random Bernoulli distributed
variable, and by leveraging on the first result we establish that
this model also leads to consensus, in the sense of convergence
in probability, in the presence of a stubborn agent. Moreover, all
agents’ opinions converge to that of the stubborn agent.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of opinion dynamics in social networks goes back
several decades; for a review, see e.g. [1], [2]. One of the most
well-known models is the DeGroot model [3] which has been
studied extensively (for a literature survey see for instance [1,
Section 3] and [2, Section 3]). In this model an agent’s opinion
is represented by a continuous real variable, which at each time
step n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} is updated to a linear combination of the
opinions of itself and its neighbors,
x[n+ 1] = Tx[n], (1)
where x[n] represents the agents’ opinions at time n and T is a
matrix that encodes the trust between agents (this is explained
in detail in Section III-A).
A particular case in opinion dynamics is where one or
more agents are stubborn (agents whose opinions remain
unchanged independent of the others’ opinions). This scenario
was first introduced by Mobilia in 2003 [4] who established
convergence rates towards consensus under the so-called voter
model [5] with a single stubborn agent. The voter model
was again considered in [6] where the optimal placement
of stubborn agents for maximal influence on the long-term
expected opinions was investigated, among other properties. In
[7] the authors considered a model in which agents can have
a continuous degree of stubbornness, and gave bounds on the
rate of convergence to a consensus of opinions. A more recent
study [8] showed that the influence of stubborn agents under
the DeGroot model can, under suitable conditions, be used to
recover the topology of the network. Specifically the authors
derived equations for the expected opinions of the ordinary
(non-stubborn) agents that depend on the topology, and then
showed how a regression problem could be formulated which
estimated matrices with information about the topology by
observing opinions that fit the equations.
Another class of models incorporates randomness, for
example in terms of random interactions [9], [10] or as
in [11], where at each time n a randomly selected agent
communicates a random opinion to its neighbors. The latter
model also features the interesting novelty that an agent
may grow increasingly stubborn over time. A recent exten-
sion of the DeGroot model which incorporates randomness
was given in [12]. Under this setting, at every time step n
each agent k chooses a Bernoulli distributed random action
Ak[n] ∼ Bernoulli(Xk[n]), and the corresponding update
rule is
X [n+ 1] = (1− α)X [n] + αTA[n], (2)
as described further in Section III-B.1 In this model, which
we will refer to as the Random Actions model (RA model
for short), the probabilities of the actions, rather than the ac-
tions/opinions themselves, are updated as a weighted average
over the neighbors’ actions.
II. CONTRIBUTIONS
We extend the RA model by the introduction of a stubborn
agent and establish that the opinion dynamics converges in
probability to a consensus even under this restriction, and
furthermore that all agents adopt the stubborn agent’s initial
opinion. While this result is intuitively expected, the proof
entails some non-trivial mathematical techniques.
As a stepping stone towards the analysis of the afore-
mentioned model we first consider the DeGroot model with
a stubborn agent as described in [8] and show that the
convergence results from that paper can be obtained with
weakened assumptions on the model. Specifically, instead of
assuming that every ordinary agent has a non-zero trust in the
stubborn agent, it suffices to assume that at least one ordinary
agent has such a trust. We then use this conclusion in proving
the claims regarding the extended RA model.
III. MODELS AND DEFINITIONS
In both models described in this section, we will consider a
directed, weighted, single-component network with K nodes,
1We use uppercase letters for random variables, e.g., X[n]. They are
distinguishable from matrices (which are deterministic), e.g., T ,Q, since the
matrices are not time dependent.
where the nodes are interpreted as agents. Before giving the
details of the models, let us at this point remind the reader of
some definitions. A sub-(row)-stochastic matrix is a square,
non-negative matrix such that the row sums are less than
or equal to 1. The word “row” will be omitted and implied
from hereon. There are two special cases of these matrices: A
stochasticmatrix is a sub-stochastic matrix where all rows sum
to 1, and a strictly sub-stochastic matrix is a sub-stochastic
matrix whose row sums are all strictly less than 1.
A. The DeGroot Model with a Stubborn Agent
In the DeGroot model [3], at every time step n ∈ {0, 1, . . .},
each agent k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} observes the opinions of its
neighbors, and updates its opinion to a linear combination of
its own opinion and those of its neighbors. The update rule is
given by Equation (1) where x[0] ∈ RK is a column vector
representing the initial opinions of the K agents and T is
a K × K stochastic matrix representing the trusts between
agents. If T n converges to a limit T∞ as n → ∞, then
consensus is reached and is given by
lim
n→∞
x[n] = lim
n→∞
T nx[0] = T∞x[0]. (3)
If the agents are viewed as nodes in a network, then T is
interpreted as an adjacency matrix with elements tij , and we
use the convention that tij > 0 represents an edge from j to
i whose weight is equal to the trust that i puts in j.
A special case is when one agent is stubborn, that is,
an agent who never updates its opinion, corresponding to
a node with only outgoing edges. Let the agents’ opinions
be partitioned into two sets of opinions, x1[n] and y[n] =
(x2[n], x3[n], . . . , xK [n])
T , held respectively by a stubborn
agent and K − 1 ordinary agents. Then we write
x[n] =
(
x1[n]
y[n]
)
. (4)
In this case the trust matrix T has the structure
T =
[
1 0
r Q
]
, (5)
where the scalar 1 represents the stubborn agent, the vector r
with dimensions (K−1)×1 represents the links from stubborn
to ordinary agent, and the matrix Q represents the edges
between ordinary agents. We will assume that all ordinary
agents are strongly connected, so that Q is irreducible.
B. The RA Model with a Stubborn Agent
In the RA model [12], at every time step each agent
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} chooses one of two actions, 0 or 1, and
these actions are generated by a Bernoulli random variable
Ak[n] with probability Xk[n]. The update of these proba-
bilities is governed by Equation (2), where α ∈ (0, 1), T
is a trust matrix (as defined in Section III-A), and A[n] =
(A1[n], A2[n], . . . , AK [n])
T are the actions with correspond-
ing probabilities X[n] = (X1[n], X2[n], . . . , XK [n])
T ∈
[0, 1]K , which themselves are stochastic for n > 0.
In the case with a stubborn agent we can assume w.l.o.g.
that this agent always chooses action 0 with probability 1.
Analogously to equations (4) and (5), we have
X[n] =
(
0
Y [n]
)
, T =
[
1 0
r Q
]
, A[n] =
(
A1[n]
B[n]
)
(6)
where r has dimension (K − 1) × 1 and B[n] =
(A2[n], A3[n], . . . , AK [n])
T . Then A1[n] = 0 with probability
1 for all n ≥ 0 and the other agents will update as in the
original RA model. Again we assume that Q is irreducible.
IV. RESULTS
The first proposition establishes the conditions for conver-
gence of the model in Section III-A with trust matrix T as
defined in (5).
Proposition 1. If at least one ordinary agent puts a non-zero
trust in the stubborn agent, that is, ti1 > 0 for some i > 1,
then the limit T n, n→∞, exists and has the structure
T∞ =
[
1 0
(I − Q)−1r 0
]
.
For the proof of Proposition 1 we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let A be an M ×M irreducible sub-stochastic
matrix with at least one row sum being strictly less than 1, and
let ρ(A) be the spectral radius of A. It holds that ρ(A) < 1.
The proofs of all lemmas in this article are given in the
appendix. Note that for a strictly sub-stochastic matrix A, we
can remove the assumption of irreducibility since it follows
directly from Theorem 8.1.22 in [13] that ρ(A) < 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. The nth power of T is
T n =
[
1 0
(I +Q+Q2 + · · ·+Qn−1)r Qn
]
, (7)
where Q is sub-stochastic with at least one row having sum
strictly less than 1. This is due to the assumption that ti1 > 0
for some i > 1, and since T is stochastic, the ith row of
Q must have sum less than 1. Finally, since Q is irreducible,
Lemma 1 applies, and we have ρ(Q) < 1. By Theorem 5.6.12
in [13], this implies that
lim
n→∞
Qn = 0. (8)
Now, consider
(I −Q)
n−1∑
k=0
Qk =
n−1∑
k=0
(
Qk −Qk+1
)
= I −Qn. (9)
By Equation (8), the right hand side of (9) tends to I in the
limit as n → ∞, and since ρ(Q) < 1 the matrix I − Q is
invertible.2 It follows that
lim
n→∞
n−1∑
k=0
Qk = (I −Q)−1. (10)
2To see this, suppose I −Q is not invertible. Then there exists a non-zero
vector v such that (I − Q)v = 0, or equivalently Qv = v, which shows
that 1 is an eigenvalue of Q. But this is impossible since ρ(Q) < 1.
With the previously discussed decomposition of x[n] into
stubborn and ordinary agents in (4), the opinions of ordinary
agents converge as n→∞:
lim
n→∞
y[n] = (I −Q)−1rx1[0]. (11)
The second proposition concerns the RA model in Section
III-B with a stubborn agent.
Proposition 2. The opinion dynamics of (2) under the re-
strictions imposed by (6) leads to herding in the sense of
convergence in probability, i.e., for every ε > 0,
lim
n→∞
P(Xk[n] < 1− ε) = 0, for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
The first part of the proof of Proposition 2 treats the con-
vergence of opinions towards a consensus in the subnetwork
induced by the ordinary agents and follows partly the proof
of Theorem 1 in [12], but with some modifications due to the
presence of the stubborn agent. The second part shows that
the consensus opinion must be equal to that of the stubborn
agent. In this part we deviate from [12] in that we show
convergence in probability, as opposed to the claimed proof of
almost sure convergence therein, which we have been unable
to verify. A detailed discussion of the differences will be
provided elsewhere. We need the following facts for the main
proof.
Lemma 2. If {W [n]}∞n=0 is a sequence of random variables
such that W [n] ∈ [0, 1] for all n ≥ 0, and
lim
n→∞
E[W [n]2(1−W [n])2] = 0,
then for all ε > 0,
lim
n→∞
P(W [n] ≤ ε ∪ W [n] ≥ 1− ε) = 1.
Lemma 3. Consider the update rule in (2) with X[n] =
(X1[n], X2[n], . . . , XK [n])
T . Suppose agent i puts trust in
agent j (so that tij > 0). If Xj[n]
P
−→ 0 and
lim
n→∞
E[Xi[n]
2(1−Xi[n])
2] = 0,
then Xi[n]
P
−→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Y [n], B[n], r and Q be defined
as in (6). Since the vector r has at least one positive element,
Q is sub-stochastic with at least one row sum strictly less than
one, so by Lemma 1 it has a largest eigenvalue λ ∈ (0, 1)
with corresponding left eigenvector ψ, ψTQ = λψT . Let
S[n] = ψTY [n]. The proof will proceed as follows: First we
show that S[n] is a strict super-martingale that converges in the
limit as n→∞ to a random variable S[∞]. Then we show that
the conditional variance of the martingale difference sequence
S[n]− S[n− 1] converges to zero in the mean square sense.
We conclude that all elements in Y [n] converge in probability
to the value of the stubborn agent, X1[0] = 0.
We will now show that S[n] is a strict super-martingale
w.r.t. Y [n], that is, E[S[n+1] | Y [n]] < S[n]. First, note that
by the update rule in Equation (2),
X[n+ 1] =
[
0
Y [n+ 1]
]
= (1− α)
[
0
Y [n]
]
+ αT
[
0
B[n]
]
.
(12)
Then we have
S[n+1] = ψTY [n+1] = ψT
(
(1−α)Y [n]+αQB[n]
)
, (13)
and by taking expectations of both sides conditioned on Y [n]
we obtain
E[S[n+ 1]|Y [n]] = (1− α)ψTY [n] + αλψTY [n]
= (1− α(1− λ))S[n] < S[n],
(14)
since (1 − λ) ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1). Thus S[n] is a strict
super-martingale, and since S[n] ≥ 0 for all n it follows from
the Martingale Convergence Theorem [14, Theorem 4.2.12]
that
S[n]
a.s.
−−→ S[∞], (15)
for some random variable S[∞] as n→∞.
Consider now the martingale difference sequence ∆S[n] =
S[n] − S[n − 1] for n > 1. First note that the almost sure
convergence of S[n] in Equation (15) implies
∆S[n]
a.s.
−−→ 0, n→∞. (16)
Furthermore, Q is irreducible and non-negative, so by the
Perron-Frobenius Theorem [13, Theorem 8.4.4] all elements of
ψ are positive. Let ψ be normalized so that 1Tψ = 1, where
1T = (1, 1, . . . , 1). Since Yk[n] ∈ [0, 1], k = 1, 2, . . . ,K − 1,
for all n ≥ 0 we then have S[n] ≤ 1 and |∆S[n]| =
|ψT (Y [n] − Y [n − 1])| ≤ 1. Therefore, by the Dominated
Convergence Theorem [14, Theorem 1.5.8] together with the
almost sure convergence in (16), ∆S[n] converges to 0 in mth
mean, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
E[|∆S[n]|m] = 0, for all m ≥ 1. (17)
We will now show that the variance of ∆S[n+1] conditioned
on Y [n] converges to zero in the mean square sense as n →
∞, and then conclude that the elements of Y [n] converge in
probability to all 0s or all 1s. We have:
Var(∆S[n+ 1] | Y [n])
= E
[(
∆S[n+ 1]− E[∆S[n+ 1] | Y [n]]
)2
| Y [n]
]
= E
[(
ψT (Y [n+ 1]− Y [n])−
ψT E[Y [n+ 1]− Y [n] | Y [n]]
)2
| Y [n]
]
= E
[(
ψTY [n+ 1]− ψT E[Y [n+ 1] | Y [n]]
)2
| Y [n]
]
= E
[(
ψT ((1− α)Y [n] + αQB[n])
−ψT ((1− α)Y [n] + αQY [n])
)2
| Y [n]
]
= E
[(
αψTQ(B[n]− Y [n])
)2
| Y [n]
]
= α2λ2ψT E
[
(B[n]− Y [n])(B[n]− Y [n])T | Y [n]
]
ψ,
(18)
where in the last step we used that ψ is a left eigenvector to
Q with eigenvalue λ. The actions B[n] ∼ Bernoulli(Y [n])
are statistically independent conditioned on Y [n], so only the
diagonal elements of the covariance matrix E
[
(B[n]−Y [n]) ·
(B[n]−Y [n])T | Y [n]
]
are non-zero. They can be expressed
explicitly as
E
[
B2k[n] | Y [n]
]
−
(
E
[
Bk[n] | Y [n]
])2
= Yk[n]− Yk[n]
2
= Yk[n](1− Yk[n]), for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,K − 1.
(19)
Therefore,
Var(∆S[n+ 1] | Y [n])
= α2λ2
K−1∑
k=1
ψ2kYk[n](1− Yk[n]).
(20)
To see that the left hand side of (20) converges to zero in the
mean square sense, consider its square:
(Var(∆S[n+ 1] | Y [n]))2
=
(
E[(∆S[n+ 1])2 | Y [n]]− (E[∆S[n+ 1] | Y [n]])2
)2
=
(
E[(∆S[n+ 1])2 | Y [n]]
)2
+
(
E[∆S[n+ 1] | Y [n]]
)4
− 2E[(∆S[n+ 1])2 | Y [n]]
(
E[∆S[n+ 1] | Y [n]]
)2
≤
(
E[(∆S[n+ 1])2 | Y [n]]
)2
+
(
E[∆S[n+ 1] | Y [n]]
)4
≤ E[(∆S[n+ 1])4 | Y [n]] + E[(∆S[n+ 1])4 | Y [n]]
= 2E[(∆S[n+ 1])4 | Y [n]],
(21)
where the first inequality holds since (∆S[n + 1])2 is non-
negative, and the second inequality is due to Jensen’s inequal-
ity [14, Theorem 1.6.2]. By taking expectations on both sides
of (21) and using the result of convergence in mth mean in
(17), we obtain
lim
n→∞
E[(Var(∆S[n+ 1] | Y [n]))2]
≤ 2 lim
n→∞
E
[
E[(∆S[n+ 1])4 | Y [n]]
]
= 2 lim
n→∞
E[(∆S[n+ 1])4] = 0.
(22)
As already noted, all elements of ψ are positive which, in view
of Equation (20) together with the mean square convergence
just proved, means that
lim
n→∞
E[(Yk[n](1−Yk[n]))
2] = 0, for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,K−1.
(23)
By Lemma 2 this implies that for all Yk[n], k = 1, 2, . . . ,K−1
and for all ε > 0, we have
lim
n→∞
P(Yk[n] < ε ∪ Yk[n] > 1− ε) = 1. (24)
Let the set of ordinary agents be denoted by O, and define
V0 as the subset of ordinary agents who put a trust in the
stubborn agent, i.e., V0 = {i ∈ O | ti1 > 0} ⊆ O; let V1 ⊆
O \ V0 denote the set of ordinary agents who put a trust in
at least one of the agents in V0, and so on. Then by Lemma
3 together with (24) it follows that the elements in {Yk[n] |
k ∈ V0} must converge in probability to 0. Consequently, the
elements in {Yk[n] | k ∈ V1} must again converge to 0. Since
Q is irreducible there is some index P such that the union of
the disjoint sets V1, V2, . . . , VP makes up the set of ordinary
agents, i.e.,
P⋃
p=1
Vp = O. (25)
By continuing in this fashion it therefore follows that all
elements in {Yk[n] | k ∈ O} must converge in probability
to the value of the stubborn agent, X1[n] = 0.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Let 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1)T and for any
m, 1 ≤ m ≤ M, let r
(n)
m = [A
n1]m be the m-th row
sum of An = {a
(n)
ij }. Since A is sub-stochastic we have that
0 ≤ r
(1)
m ≤ 1 for all m, and further that for any n ≥ 1,
r(n+1)m =
M∑
j=1
a
(n+1)
mj =
M∑
j=1
(
M∑
k=1
a
(n)
mkakj
)
=
M∑
k=1

a(n)mk
M∑
j=1
akj

 = M∑
k=1
a
(n)
mkr
(1)
k .
(26)
Therefore
r(n+1)m ≤
M∑
k=1
a
(n)
mk = r
(n)
m , (27)
so the row sums are non-increasing with powers of A. By
assumption at least one row sum is strictly less than 1, so
w.l.o.g. we can assume that the rows of A are ordered such
that this applies to the first row sum, i.e., r
(1)
1 < 1. By the
irreducibility of A, for any m there is a positive integer lm
such that a
(lm)
m1 > 0 (since the induced network is strongly
connected). In fact, if m 6= 1 we have lm < M (take the
shortest path from node m to node 1). By using (26) we
therefore obtain, for any row m,
r(lm+1)m =
M∑
j=1
a
(lm)
mj r
(1)
j =
M∑
j=2
a
(lm)
mj r
(1)
j + a
(lm)
m1 r
(1)
1
≤
M∑
j=2
a
(lm)
mj + a
(lm)
m1 r
(1)
1 <
M∑
j=1
a
(lm)
mj = r
(lm)
m ,
(28)
which together with (27) shows that every row sum of An is
strictly less than 1 for all n ≥M . By Theorem 8.1.22 in [13],
the spectral radius of a non-negative matrix is bounded from
above by the maximum row sum. This means that ρ(AM ) < 1,
and since ρ(AM ) = ρ(A)M , we therefore obtain ρ(A) <
1.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let µ > 0, and set γ = µε2(1 − ε)2. We
know that
lim
n→∞
E[W [n]2(1 −W [n])2]
= lim
n→∞
∫ 1
0
w2(1− w)2fW [n](w)dw = 0,
(29)
where fW [n](w) is the probability density function of W [n].
Thus there exists N > 0 such that A+B+C < γ for n ≥ N ,
where
A =
∫ ε
0
w2(1− w)2fW [n](w)dw,
B =
∫ 1−ε
ε
w2(1− w)2fW [n](w)dw,
C =
∫ 1
1−ε
w2(1− w)2fW [n](w)dw.
(30)
But A > 0 and C > 0, so B < γ for all n ≥ N , and
γ > B ≥ ε2(1− ε)2
∫ 1−ε
ε
fW [n](w)dw, (31)
which implies
∫ 1−ε
ε
fW [n](w)dw ≤
γ
ε2(1− ε)2
= µ. (32)
Since (32) holds for all µ > 0 and ε > 0, we have
lim
n→∞
P(ε < W [n] < 1− ε) = 0, (33)
or equivalently,
lim
n→∞
P(W [n] ≤ ε ∪ W [n] ≥ 1− ε) = 1. (34)
Proof of Lemma 3. We know from Lemma 2 that for all ε > 0
and δ > 0 there exists N1 > 0 such that for all n ≥ N1,
P(ε < Xi[n+ 1] < 1− ε) <
δ
2
. (35)
The assumption that Xj [n]
P
−→ 0 as n→∞, together with the
uniform integrability of Xj [n] (it is bounded by the interval
[0, 1]) implies that the expected value of Xj[n] also converges
to 0. (This is a standard result in probability theory. See, e.g.,
[14, Theorem 5.5.2].) Thus, for all δ > 0 there exists N2 > 0
such that for all n ≥ N2,
E[Xj [n]] <
δ
2
. (36)
We want to show that Xi[n]
P
−→ 0 as n → ∞. To this end,
recall that α ∈ (0, 1) and that tij > 0 since we assume that i
puts a trust in j. Let 0 < ε < αtij and δ > 0. Then for all
n > max{N1, N2}, we have
P(Xi[n+ 1] > ε)
= P(Xi[n+ 1] ≥ 1− ε) + P(ε < Xi[n+ 1] < 1− ε)
< P(Xi[n+ 1] ≥ 1− ε) +
δ
2
=
∫
x
P(Xi[n+ 1] ≥ 1− ε |X[n] = x)fX[n](x)dx+
δ
2
=
∫
x
P
(
(1− α)xi + α
K∑
k=1
tikAk[n] ≥ 1− ε |X [n] = x
)
· fX[n](x)dx+
δ
2
≤
∫
x
P(1− α+ α(1 − tij(1 −Aj [n])) ≥ 1− ε |X[n] = x)
· fX[n](x)dx+
δ
2
=
∫
x
P(αtij(1−Aj [n]) ≤ ε | X[n] = x)fX[n](x)dx+
δ
2
=
∫
x
P(1−Aj [n] ≤
ε
αtij
|X[n] = x)fX[n](x)dx+
δ
2
≤
∫
x
xjfX[n](x)dx+
δ
2
= E[Xj [n]] +
δ
2
<
δ
2
+
δ
2
= δ,
(37)
where the first inequality follows from (35), the second
inequality follows from the facts that
∑K
k=1 tikAk[n] ≤∑K
k=1,k 6=j tik + tijAj [n] = 1− tij + tijAj [n] and Xi[n] ≤ 1,
and the last inequality follows from (36). We have also
used the fact that Aj [n] ∼ Bernoulli(Xj [n]) conditioned on
Xj [n].
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